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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1872 
___________ 
 
JOE M. TONEY, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. SASSAMAN; G. KALUGO; D. REED; J. CARPENTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 4-11-cv-00780) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 18, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 9, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Joe M. Toney, a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals 
from the District Court’s order dismissing his due process claims and granting summary 
judgment to the defendants on his retaliation claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Toney claims that the defendants destroyed his property without due process and 
in retaliation for bringing a separate civil action against them.  On August 27, 2009, while 
incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Toney flooded 
his cell by breaking a sprinkler.  He claims he did so because staff members poisoned his 
food and he needed medical attention.  The water damaged much of Toney’s property, 
and staff members disposed of the damaged property. 
 Toney pursued a variety of administrative remedies in response to the disposal of 
his property, none of which was successful.  He then filed this action pursuant to Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
After more than a year of litigation, Toney requested appointed counsel, which the 
District Court denied.  The District Court then dismissed Toney’s due process claims, 
granted summary judgment to the defendants on his retaliation claims, denied Toney’s 
motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Toney’s motion for default judgment as 
moot.  Toney timely appealed.  He has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel in 
this Court and a motion for an order. 
3 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District 
Court’s decision to deny appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion.  Tabron v. 
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our review of the District Court’s dismissal and 
summary judgment orders is plenary.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 
Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment); Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (motion to dismiss).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment because this appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The District Court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in denying Toney’s request 
for appointment of counsel.  Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157.  To the contrary, the District Court 
summarized the applicable standards, weighed the relevant factors, and explained its 
reasons for denying Toney’s request in a detailed order.  Toney has not identified any 
errors in this order and we perceive none. 
 Nor do we find any errors in the District Court’s decision to dismiss Toney’s claim 
that the defendants deprived him of property without due process.  Due process claims 
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for negligent deprivations of property by prison officials are barred by Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).  As to any alleged intentional deprivations of 
property, Toney had adequate post-deprivation remedies—the Bureau of Prison’s 
administrative remedy program and administrative claims procedure—and the record 
indicates that he had notice and took advantage of these remedies.  As such, his claims 
for intentional deprivations fail.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); 
Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because 
these claims were legally flawed, the District Court correctly concluded that amendment 
would be futile.  Therefore, dismissal with prejudice was proper.  See Fletcher-Harlee 
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Turning to Toney’s retaliation claims, this Court considers whether:  (1) Toney 
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against 
him by prison officials sufficient to deter him from exercising his constitutional rights; 
and (3) there was a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the 
adverse action taken against him.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  As 
to the third element, “[e]ven if timing alone could ever be sufficient to establish a causal 
link, we believe that the timing of the alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually 
suggestive’ of retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.”  Krouse v. Am. 
Sterilizers Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 We agree with the District Court that Toney failed to provide any evidence of a 
causal link between the filing of his earlier legal action and the destruction of his 
property.  These events occurred more than one month apart and no other facts suggest 
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retaliatory motive.  The inference that the defendants disposed of Toney’s property 
because of the water damage from Toney flooding his cell is much more compelling.  
Accordingly, summary judgment for the defendants on Toney’s retaliation claim was 
proper. 
III. 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  Toney’s motions for appointment of counsel and for 
an order are denied as moot.  
